Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Mental states: Mental states are internal states of mind that include thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations, and perceptions. They are subjective experiences that cannot be directly observed by others. See also Brain states, Brain, Thoughts, Thinking, Cognition, Consciousness, Perception, Sensation, Emotions, Behavior._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Hartry Field on Mental States - Dictionary of Arguments
II 84 Mental states/intentionality/Stalnaker: per pragmatic image: belief contents are coarse grained - understandable in terms of the role in the characterization of actions. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. Field: per linguistic image. >Linguistic view/Field. II 88 Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: we should manage without intrinsically representative mental states. >Mental states, >Representations/Stalnaker. Non-intrinsical representational states: also have content, can be synonymous. - On the other hand intrinsically representative: E.g. object of believe as an ordered triple from Caesar, Rubicon, Cross. II 89 Possible world/sets of worlds/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is that they form a Boolean algebra. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Field. II 100 Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that satisfies a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mental states. (Via sets of possible worlds). >Intentionality. Instead: we need a systematic of the connection of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds. Cf. >Hyperintensionality._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Mental States
